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Abstract
The current article focuses on the special aspects of venture capital’s value creation 
methods, summarizing the author’s researches in this field. This article puts special 
emphasis on the scrutiny of the Hungarian market as the value creation practices 
on the domestic market have not been revealed thoroughly in the literature yet. 
The article attempts to examine the performance of venture capital, especially the 
JEREMIE funds, according to the limited available secondary data of the companies 
involved, which helps to assess the role of the government in bridging the financial 
gap and solving the problems in the venture capital market in Hungary. In this field 
reliable statistical data is not available, but there is an ongoing primer research led 
by the author, producing new information soon. The article presents the special 
investment and value creating methods of venture capitalists. In the first part of the 
article the theoretical background is presented, and in the second part of the article 
the author’s research results are demonstrated following the same order.
Keywords: venture capital, value creation, governmental role.
INTRODUCTION
The main question of the article is how venture capitalists create value, what 
the special aspects of their value creating mechanism are, and how it works 
in Hungary. The relevance of the topic is, that the JEREMIE program launched 
by the European Union spurred the venture capital market of the Central and 
Eastern European region that made research in the field topical as previously 
unprecedented number of investments were made in the region. The great 
majority of the investments made by JEREMIE funds are currently active 
therefore bringing a verdict about the performance of the program would 
be premature therefore making certain conclusions about the program are 
limited. The exit performance and the return on investment can only be 
evaluated after the closure of the funds, but as the information about exits 
is usually confidential the evaluation in this field of venture capital funding is 
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limited. Nonetheless the program is in the early stages and only at the end of 
its investment period can the scope of the portfolio companies be outlined 
and some conclusions reached about the state of the demand and supply 
side of the market. 
The contribution of the article to the topic is that it puts special emphasis 
on the scrutiny of the Hungarian market, as the value creation practices on 
the domestic market have not been thoroughly revealed in the literature 
yet. The article attempts to examine the performance of venture capital, 
especially the JEREMIE funds, based on the limited available data of the 
companies involved, which helps to assess the role of the government in 
bridging the financial gap and solving the problems in the venture capital 
market in Hungary.
In the literature review the article introduces the theoretical framework 
of the analysis and the most important economic theories that are connected 
to venture capital funding. The literature review discusses the effects of 
imperfections in the venture capital market, the two-level principal-agent 
relationship that evolves in venture capital financing, the problem of funding 
gaps, the specialties of young and innovative companies’ capital structure, 
and the relevance and methods of active and passive roles of state. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The following section will describe the theoretical background of the special 
aspects of venture capital’s value creating mechanisms based on the literature. 
There is an enhanced information asymmetry in the venture capital market 
that results in an increased uncertainty in the industry but, on the other hand, 
by selecting companies with huge growth potential and providing them value 
added services, the investors can benefit from the increasing value of these 
companies. Hence, there is the possibility of realizing extremely high returns 
on their investments. The inefficiencies of the venture capital market can be 
alleviated by informal venture capital investors and by the public sector’s 
direct and indirect involvement.
Imperfections in the venture capital market
Venture capitalists are financial intermediaries who collect capital from 
individuals and institutional investors then manage and invest the 
accumulated capital. They make their investments into private companies, 
not listed on the stock exchange, for equity in the company and/or optional 
rights for gaining further ownership. Venture capital investments are long 
term cooperation between investors and entrepreneurs in order to alleviate 
the increase of the firm’s value and benefit from this growth by selling their 
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shares for a high profit. Venture capitalists take part in the control of the 
invested companies and usually they not receive dividends but reinvest the 
profits into the companies in order to enhance further growth. Traditional 
venture capital investors mainly focus on the early stages of the companies 
while buyout funds are for larger scale investments where the focus is more 
on the matured stages of the companies (Prowse, 1998, p. 22; Karsai, 1997, 
p. 168; Becskyné Nagy, 2008).
There is an increased information asymmetry in the venture capital 
market and the problem of adverse selection arises with a higher chance in 
the case of companies that are the focus of these investments (Hall, 2002; 
Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 2015a). The economic models that are based on 
the concept of information asymmetry provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding the inefficiencies that evolve in the market of the young and 
innovative enterprises and for exploring the methods that could alleviate the 
funding and knowledge gaps. In an imperfect informational environment the 
market cannot reach its optimal efficiency. Leland and Pyle (1977) describes 
the ‘missing market’ problem which says, that in markets where enhanced 
information asymmetry occurs the supply of capital will disappear if on the 
demand side the number of those companies that are not suitable for obtaining 
capital is too high. In order to bring suitable investment opportunities to 
the surface the bridging of the information gap via the transfer of relevant 
information is necessary. According to Hall (2002) venture capitalists are 
able to bridge this information gap, but in case of the Hungarian market the 
investors could not fulfill this role. Furthermore, government involvement 
was necessary in order to provide information for the venture capitalists.
In connection with the concept of information asymmetry, the pecking 
order theory is also a relevant economic theory that describes the hierarchy 
of the different capital sources (Myers, 1984, 2001; Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Based on this theory, entrepreneurs have an information advantage about 
their companies and their goal is not in finding the optimal proportion of 
the different funding sources, but instead entrepreneurs have preferences 
towards the funding sources and they try to obtain the most preferred 
funding sources if they are available. In venture capital funding the general 
partners become owners of the companies with voting rights and they have 
insight into the operation of the companies that decreases the informational 
advantage of the entrepreneurs. In addition to this, as a result of its high 
profit expectations, venture capital can be the most expensive form of 
funding. Based on the findings of Zoppa and McMahon (2002) small and 
medium-sized enterprises are less willing to dilute the ownership structure, 
hence they prefer internal financing like retained earnings, depreciation and 
amortization and also debt financing, rather than external equity financing. 
34 / The Special Aspects of Venture Capital’s Value Creating Mechanisms in Hungary 
Innovation in Finance
Katarzyna Prędkiewicz, Olga Kalinowska-Beszczyńska, Judit Karsai (Eds.)
However, the innovative companies are unable to obtain debt financing 
as they are about to enter new markets, their products are usually in the 
development stage and they do not have collateral (Philott, 1994; Gompers, 
1995; Hall, 2002). In addition to this, the information gap that occurs in the 
case of these companies imposes further limits on the available funding 
forms (Mason & Harrison, 1998).
The principal-agent theory is in close connection with capital structure 
theories that are focusing on the wealth maximization of the owners. 
Sahlman (1990) was the first who presented the two-level principal-agent 
relationship that evolves in venture capital financing, where the venture 
capitalists are the principals in terms of their relationship with the portfolio 
companies. But on the other hand, in managing the funds they also act as 
agents for those investors who provide the capital to the venture capital 
funds in order to gain profit via the successful investment activity of the 
venture capitalists. Therefore, in managing the problems that derive from 
information asymmetry and the principal-agent relationship, such as adverse 
selection and moral hazard issues, the venture capitalists play a crucial role in 
the success of these investments, so venture capital contracts include various 
clauses in order to solve these problems. However, as a result of the ‘noise’ in 
the information the uncertainties deriving from the informational problems 
cannot be eliminated (Reid, 1999; Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 2015a).
The special expertise and business experience of venture capitalists 
enables them to get the companies through the early stages of their life 
when the uncertainty is very high hence they are able to exploit the growth 
potential of these companies. The competence of venture capitalists can be 
harnessed via the cooperation of the entrepreneurs and investors so the 
personnel contribution of venture capitalists is indispensable for enhancing 
the growth of these companies (Becskyné-Nagy, 2008).
The real options approach of venture capital shows how venture capital is 
able and willing to manage efficiently the high uncertainty of these companies 
that derives from the business risks, information asymmetries and moral 
hazard issues. Based on the real options approach of venture capital these 
investments are projects with high flexibility and managers can create options 
and gain profit by benefiting from the positive outcomes and mitigating the 
downside risks (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; Kaplan, Sensoy & Strömberg, 2009; 
Copeland & Keenan, 1998). In this sense venture capital funds are portfolios 
created from real options and the managers of the funds can influence the 
value of these options. From an option valuation perspective, the increased 
uncertainty increases the value of these investments as a result of the 
inherent options, contrary to the traditional valuation approaches where 
risks decrease the utility of investors. Real options’ reasoning relies on the 
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special expertise of venture capital investors and describes, from a valuation 
point of view, why venture capitalists are willing to fund these enterprises. In 
this sense the valuation itself is a special area of venture capital where value 
creation appears.
Venture capitalists use various tools and methods in order to manage 
the high risks of their investments, like; high profit expectations, screening, 
the use of special contract stipulations and syndicate agreements, the use 
of convertibles and preference shares, the monitoring of investments, 
multi-staged financing of companies, diversification and the integration of 
portfolio-companies into networks. The role of high profit expectations is to 
compensate the investors for the risks of the investments. Screening and due 
diligence can ensure the quality of the investments and via these activities 
venture capitalists can select companies for their portfolios that could 
be viable on the market and have the greatest growth potential. After the 
process of selection an investment contract is drawn up with various clauses 
built into it in order to eliminate special risks. The use of different financial 
instruments, like preference shares and convertible securities are also very 
widespread in these contracts that could protect the investors from downside 
risks while maintaining the chance of achieving high returns. The opportunity 
to revise the investments at certain stages is provided by the multi-staged 
funding, where additional investments are often bound to the condition 
of reaching given milestones. This method enables the investors to create 
options in the investments that could mitigate the downside risks hence 
the risk-return characteristics are favorable compared to straightforward 
funding. The investment decision is followed by the monitoring of the 
invested companies as a part of the cooperation of venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs. One purpose of the monitoring is to reduce the information 
asymmetry, hence the possible negative effects that could arise from the 
principal-agent relationship while, on the other hand, through their special 
expertise they can improve the performance and increase the value of the 
companies. Especially in larger portfolios the effect of diversification leads to 
more favorable risk-return characteristics (Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 2015a).
The selection criteria of venture capital
As selection is the first and crucial step in the process of the value creation 
in venture capital funding prior to the investment decision itself, it is very 
important to collect the most important selection criteria of venture 
capitalists from the literature. Only a few enterprises are able to meet the 
standards and criteria imposed by the venture capitalists. Only companies 
with high profit expectations and great growth potential are able to obtain 
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venture capital, around 90% of the companies that seek venture capital 
funding are rejected by the investors (Petty & Gruber, 2011). As selection is 
an essential momentum in the value creation there is an extensive literature 
that discusses the topic. 
The first step of the selection process is the screening. According to the 
early study of Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) the companies are evaluated at the 
beginning of the screening based on the size of the investment, the industry 
and the applied technology, geographical location and the lifecycle stage 
of the companies. The business plans usually cover the mentioned criteria 
therefore the submission of the business plan is usually the first milestone 
in the selection process (Hudson & Evans, 2005). Companies in a very early 
stage of their life with lower capital needs are usually out of the target of 
venture capital. As a result of the costs of the investment process, especially 
the cost of due diligence, for institutional venture capitalists, investing under 
a certain amount of capital is not economical (Osman, 2008). For companies 
with lower capital needs, government funds, R&D tenders or angel investors 
can provide funding. The importance of geographical location is in connection 
with the personnel involvement of the venture capitalists (Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984). In the seed, early and early expansion stages the companies are in 
an imperfect information environment, with regards to the market and 
technology that decreases their chance of obtaining venture capital (Norton 
& Tannenbaum, 1993).
The first stage of the screening is followed by the scrutiny of the 
entrepreneur and the management, the product, the market characteristics 
and the financial aspects. The entrepreneur’s expertise, managerial and 
professional competences, personality and commitment all play a crucial 
role in the investment decision, as the cooperation of the entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists is a key factor in the fate of the investments and a 
detailed analysis of the management can reduce the risks of principal-agent 
relationship (Becskyné Nagy, 2008; Becsky-Nagy, 2016; Dubini, 1989; Franke, 
Gruber, Harhoff & Henkel, 2008; Hall & Hofer, 1993). The technical uncertainty 
that arise in connection with new products and services is another important 
factor in the selection of companies as technically feasible products and 
services that are often protected by patent can lead to a rapid growth in sales. 
The level of competition in the market and the threat of new entrants are 
also an important factor as in saturated markets the growth’s opportunities 
are usually lower. The high initial costs of creating the prototype and also 
the cost of applied technology can only be compensated by high selling 
prices (Silva, 2004; Halaska, 2012; Petty & Gruber, 2011). Concerning market 
conditions, the industry, the potential size of the market, the probability of 
entering international markets, the chance of gaining permanent competitive 
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advantage, the threat of substitute products and the volatility of the market 
are the most important factors that affect the growth potential of the invested 
companies. The exit opportunities, the time and possible method of the exit 
and the expected return are also taken into consideration in the investment 
decision (Becskyné & Biczók, 2006). Not just the individual characteristics of 
the companies have a role in the selection but also their contribution to the 
overall risk of the venture capitalists portfolio is important.
According to Shepard, Zacharakis and Baron (2003) the experience of 
the venture capitalists is in correlation with the success of their decisions. 
The more experienced venture capitalists are more successful in their 
investments as well, but on the other hand an overly long investment record 
leads to automatic decisions and by neglecting the unique aspects of each 
investment the chances of success may decrease.
Venture capital in the capital structure of companies
After the selection, according to the investment process, the venture capital’s 
position in the capital structure is crucial, as voting rights, control over the 
portfolio company and also the level of risk taking depends on the given 
financial instrument conditions. Based on many studies the convertible 
preference share is the optimal financial instrument for providing capital 
in venture capital funding (Berglöf, 1994; Casamatta, 2003; Cestone, 2000; 
Cornelli & Yosha, 2003; Marx, 1998; Schmidt, 2003; Trester, 1998) and this 
theory was confirmed by empirical studies as well (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003; 
Bergemann & Hege, 1998). The special rights incorporated into preference 
shares can entitle venture capitalists to take control of the firm if the manager’s 
performance hinders the success off the investment. In extreme cases of 
the principal-agent problem, these instruments provide an opportunity for 
venture capitalists to solve the conflict of investors and managers (Becsky-
Nagy & Fazekas, 2015a). This instrument also has a favorable effect on the 
position of investors in case of liquidation. According to Cumming (2005), in 
the case of the US, the tax benefits of convertible preference shares are an 
additional advantage of this financial instrument, but based on his research 
focusing on the Canadian market, he stated after analyzing 3000 companies, 
that there is not a prevailing method that could describe in a general way 
the funding practice of venture capitalists. Based on his research the form 
of common equity was the most widespread followed by debt financing 
and convertible bonds and convertible preference share was the fourth in 
this rank, but also a combination of the previous methods was observed. 
Furthermore he found a connection between the form of funding and the 
type of firm and, based on his results in the case of younger enterprises, 
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the use of convertible preference shares is more frequent because in these 
companies the principal-agent problem evolves with higher probability. In 
early stage investments, venture capitalists do not favor debt, convertible 
bonds or the combination of equity and debt as a funding form, because 
these methods cannot provide the required control rights (Becsky-Nagy & 
Karászi, 2015). 
The personnel contribution of venture capitalists
After the investment decision and contracts, the next step in the venture 
capitalists value creating process is the managerial support of the company. In 
their early stages the invested companies usually do not possess the decisive 
information and knowledge to formulate a strategy for their company and 
to manage it successfully (Rasila, Seppa & Hannula, 2002). The founders of 
young, innovative companies are usually experts with high qualifications but 
they do not have the necessary managerial and business experience (Vohor, 
Wright & Lockett, 2004). A special segment of the potential investments is 
the group of spin-off companies that commercialize technology and research 
with university origin, where the lack of managerial expertise is especially 
prevalent (Becsky-Nagy, 2013; Becsky-Nagy, Papp & Tóth, 2014). 
One unique feature of venture capitalists is that, in addition to the 
capital, they also offer managerial assistance and can provide the necessary 
knowledge to run the company (Wright, Lockett, Clarysse & Binks, 2006). 
Through their personal contribution and knowledge transfer, venture 
capitalists are able to bridge not only the funding gaps that occur in case of 
young and innovative companies, but they also play an important role in the 
alleviation of the information and knowledge gap. The sources of the missing 
information and knowledge are a lack of managerial skills, market experience, 
engineering and professional skills. The other reason for the information gap 
is the uncertainty that derives from new technologies and new products that 
are introduced on previously non-existing markets with uncharted customer 
needs. The product itself often exists only as an idea and the companies 
shall deliver these plans to the market with the purpose of achieving a 
permanent competitive market advantage. Via the cooperation of investors 
and entrepreneurs, the venture capitalists are able to provide the necessary 
knowledge and information and also access to their extensive business 
networks. In order to reduce the risks of principal-agent relationship and to 
provide the non-financial value added services, the personnel contribution 
of the investors is necessary, therefore venture capitalists usually delegate 
members onto the supervisory board and appoint the chief executive of the 
firm. The presence of venture capitalists in the management team gives an 
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insight into the operation of the invested companies and strengthens the 
functions of monitoring, control and governance, thereby reducing the risks 
of the investors (Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz & Dial, 2001; Becsky-Nagy, 
2016). However, the founders of small companies are not willing to share 
their innovative idea with the investors prior to investment because they fear 
that if the investment negotiations fail than the investors will implement and 
gain profit from their ideas. Another problem is that the founders are often 
biased towards their own ideas and they are not willing to take the advice 
and guidance of investors that may lead to compromises and the restricted 
freedom of their decisions.
The dynamic three-factor model (3C model) of value creation 
demonstrates the main sources of venture capital’s value creation that are 
capital, competence and cooperation (Becskyné- Nagy, 2008). The structural 
factors of venture capital are the size of the funds, the size of the deals, and 
the industrial and geographical extension. The model says that the value 
creation mechanism of venture capital is a self-feeding process where the 
sources and the structural factors become more and more extensive in time. 
Alongside the provided knowledge and capital, there is also a great 
emphasis placed on cooperation, as a deteriorating relationship between 
investors and entrepreneurs, a conflict of interests or excessive control over 
the entrepreneurs, could lead to the failure of the investment. Cooperation, 
fair compromises and mutual trust is vital in order to create a well-functioning 
company.
The role of state in the venture capital market
Despite the fact that venture capitalists can create value in an investment 
process, there are insufficient market situations, when as a result of the 
information gap or the funding gap the supply side and the demand side of 
the venture capital market are not in the equilibrium. In these situations the 
state can help to shift the supply or the demand of venture capital.
Venture capital is a funding method that is able to alleviate the early 
stage funding problems of innovative firms with huge growth potential, but 
at the same time, because of the market inefficiencies that lead to funding 
gaps in the market of these companies, the question arises whether the 
active or passive role of the public sector is necessary to solve the funding 
problems of these enterprises. Table 1 contains the types of passive and active 
government participation in the venture capital industry. The active role of 
government on the venture capital market means that the state increases the 
supply of capital by providing funds in order to bridge the information gap or 
because of the absence of institutional investors’ interest. The primary goal of 
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an active state role is to provide funding for those early stage companies that 
have huge growth potential, but for market investors, making investments in 
these companies is not economical because of the high transaction costs of 
selection and due diligence. Based on Hungarian and international evidence, 
direct state involvement does not lead to general success in the venture 
capital market. Government interventions have had a distorting effect on the 
market. One of the most important value creating factors of venture capital 
is the competence and managerial assistance of investors but in the absence 
of market investors this value enhancing effect cannot prevail. The public 
sector investors’ contribution to the development of companies is mainly 
confined to the capital provided but the other resources of venture capital, 
like competence and business networks do not occur in the case of public 
investments. Therefore, the public venture capital backed companies could 
not achieve such growth as the private venture capital backed companies do 
(Bottazzi & Darin, 2002; Schilder, 2006f; Luukkonen, Deschryvere & Bertoni, 
2013; Grilli & Murtinu, 2014; Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 2015b; Fazekas, 2014).
Table 1. Passive and active government participation in the venture capital 
industry
Passive government participation in the venture capital industry Active 
government 
participation 
in the venture 
capital industry
Passive government participation in 
the funding of technology-driven small 
enterprises
Active government 
participation in the 
funding of technology-
driven small enterprises
Stable economic environment
Stable political environment
Mitigation of country risks
High GDP
High public R&D expenditure
Environment favourable for innovation
Environment incentivising entrepreneurial 
activities
Institutional and statutory conditions
Support by business angels
Support by incubators
Facilitating the development of the capital 
market
Tax allowance for investors
Government loan and capital guarantees
Training, education
Improvement of entrepreneurial culture
Promotion of information flow
Non-reimbursable 
government grants for 
innovation and research 
and development
Tax allowances for 
innovation and research 
and development 
activities
Subsidised loans for 
the implementation of 
innovative research and 
development activities
Investment of 
budget resources 
in venture capital 
funds
Management of 
venture capital 
funds created 
from budget 
resources
Source: Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas (2015b)
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The primary goal of a passive state role is to promote a stable economic 
and political environment that is able to create and sustain an efficient 
venture capital market. Incentivizing the market to evolve an innovative 
entrepreneurial environment contributes to the development of the demand 
side of the market that leads to an increasing number of technology-oriented, 
innovative enterprises via improving the entrepreneurial spirit. By ensuring a 
stable economic, political and legal environment and mitigating the regional 
and national risk, investment activity can be spurred into action that leads 
to the expansion of the capital’s supply. The role of the state is also pivotal 
in spurring the development and efficiency of the primary and secondary 
capital markets (Ludányi, 2002; Lerner, 1996). Table 1 contains the possible 
methods of active and passive state roles.
RESEARCH METHODS
As venture capitalists confidentially handle the information about their 
investments we do not have perfect information with regards to this funding 
form, especially about its return characteristics. The organizations that collect 
data about the returns on venture capital have to face various problems. The 
data is provided on a voluntary basis by the funds and, furthermore, the 
different databases use different methodologies. Although the latter research 
and databases provide more reliable results, we have to be aware of the fact 
that, in the interpretation of the results, there might be biases. In addition 
to the lack of data the analysis of return characteristics has methodological 
problems as well. The article attempts to collect the results of the Hungarian 
research based on the relevant secondary and primary sources.
The most commonly used secondary source of the return measure is 
IRR (Internal Rate of Return) that measures all returns based on the period’s 
cash flows, so as to make the investments comparable with other venture 
capital investments, or other type of investments. Horizontal IRR takes the 
net asset value at the beginning of the period as a negative cash flow, and 
the cash inflows within the period and the net asset value at the end of the 
period are positive cash flows and then IRR is calculated based on these cash 
flows. Horizontal IRR is able to show the industry trends. Net asset value is 
the residual value of the venture capitalists investments at the end of the 
period, in other words it shows the value of the still active investments. 
Rolling IRR shows the change of horizontal IRR in every year retrospectively. 
Pooled IRR shows the aggregated industry returns on the basis of the cash 
flows within the period modified by the residual values of the investments at 
the end of the given period. One drawback of using this measure is that IRR 
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assumes the reinvestment of cash flows, which is rarely possible in the case 
of venture capital funds. Therefore, IRR can overestimate the actual return 
on funds invested, as there is a negative correlation between the return and 
the length of the investment. In addition to this, venture capitalists are more 
willing to only provide information about their successful investments which 
leads to an upward bias in the results (Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 2014).
The primary sources of data collection in the case of Hungarian 
investments are the business journals, internet portals and data provided by 
the investors. After the investments are identified, the financial reports of 
the invested companies provide further information about the parameters of 
their investments including the size of investment, change in sales and income 
etc. The databases of the European Venture Capital Association and the 
Hungarian Venture Capital Association provide data about the accumulated 
capital, the committed capital and about exit events. The main method of the 
industry’s scrutiny is still in the form of a case study as a result of the scarce 
information that limits the possibility of drawing more general conclusions.
Questionnaires come up against difficulties as the parties to investments 
are not willing to answer special key questions because of the confidentiality 
clauses in investment contracts and they consider this information to be a 
business secret (Glavanits, 2015). 
In my previous research, in order to investigate the unique aspects of 
Hungarian venture capital investments, I compiled several case studies. 
Although more general conclusions cannot be drawn from these case studies, 
they did highlight the special moving forces and key factors of the industry 
(Becskyné-Nagy, 2008). 
In connection with the selection criteria of the venture capitalists, we 
created a questionnaire based on the findings of the international literature, 
and asked all the Hungarian venture capital fund manager firms about their 
opinion (Dávid & Becsky-Nagy, 2016).
In 2012, I took part in research that focused on spin-offs in the capital 
and rural towns of Hungary. Spin-offs are a special field of venture capital 
investments, where the value creating contribution of the venture capitalists 
is similar to the general venture capital investments. In this research, I 
investigated the financing prospects of these companies. We observed 80 
spin-offs and 38 of these companies were included in the research. Although 
the funding problems of spin-offs do not entirely cover the problems of 
venture capital’s potential investment targets, and are just a segment of it, it 
is assumable that their problems are similar to those companies that do not 
stem from universities (Becsky-Nagy, 2013).
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ANALYSIS/STUDY
The following section describes the findings of research into the venture 
capital value creating process based on the literature review and on the 
empirical research made by the author herself or as a member of a research 
group. The deductions of the research are not mentioned here, as those are 
written down in the referred publications. In this part, I follow the structure of 
the theoretical background where the following propositions were described. 
Selection criteria
As a first step of the value creating mechanism of the venture capitalists, we 
examined the selection criteria of the potential portfolio companies. Through 
the synthesis and comparative analysis of the literature review in the field of 
the selection process of venture capital, they show that the most important 
criteria for venture capitalists, in order, are:
 • return on investment,
 • managerial skills of the entrepreneurs,
 • growth potential of the market,
 • professional experience of the founder,
 • exit prospects,
 • track record of the CEO (Dávid & Becsky-Nagy, 2016).
This ranking reflects the priorities of Hungarian investors towards the 
factors that are mentioned in the literature. The most important difference 
between Hungarian and international investors is that, in the opinion of 
international investors managerial skills play the most important role, while 
in the ranking of Hungarian investors the possible return has first place. At the 
same time, it is a common characteristic that investors put much emphasis on 
the skills, competence and experience of the executives in their investment 
decisions.
Venture capital in the capital structure of companies
In the venture capital market of the Central and Eastern European region, 
around 50% of the accumulated capital was provided by government funds. 
In the background of this dominance is the JEREMIE Program, where the 
capital of the funds is provided by the public and the private sector together 
and managed by market backed investors. Within the framework of this 
program, investments have been made in Hungary since 2010.
After the appearance of JEREMIE funds in 2010 they have become 
dominant in the Hungarian market. In 25% of the companies that received 
funding via JEREMIE, the investors used some form of preference shares to 
provide capital, in order to ensure adequate control over their companies 
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(Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 2015b). In the case of the other companies, the 
investors became majority shareholders hence the additional rights provided 
by preference shares were unnecessary. Syndicated investments, in which 
the risks are shared between the investors, could also be observed. In other 
cases the mixed use of debt and equity financing could be observed as well. 
There is no optimal and generally accepted practice as to how the capital 
provided by the venture capitalists should appear in the capital structure 
of the invested companies. The nature of the company, the stage in their 
lifecycle and other unique features of the companies, influence the ideal 
financial instruments that facilitate the growth of these companies the most, 
and hence increase their chances of a funding contract. Preference shares, 
convertible preference shares, convertible bonds, common shares and the 
combination of equity and debt financing, are widespread in Hungary as well 
as in the more developed countries, but compared to the market in the US 
convertible preference shares are not the most dominant instruments in 
Hungary.
Returns of venture capital
The returns on venture capital can be a measure of the venture capitalists’ 
value creation, though it is impossible to separate the venture capitalists 
contribution to the success, from the contribution of other parties. But the 
question was whether the venture capital backed companies can provide 
higher yields than others. In the case of venture capital investment returns, 
examined through IRR, this can be realized via exiting the invested companies, 
so the return characteristics of venture capital reflects how the value of the 
acquired shares increased within the investment period (Becsky-Nagy & 
Fazekas, 2014). By analyzing the returns in the markets of the US and Europe 
it is clear, that on average, the returns of the buyout funds that invest larger 
sums into more matured companies, were higher than the returns of the 
traditional venture capital investments. On the basis of risk-return trade-
off, buyout funds outperformed venture capital funds as well. In terms of 
geographical differences, the returns of the US venture capital market were 
higher than the returns of the European funds, which can be explained by 
the more developed stage of the US market. Figure 1 also shows that the 
return on venture capital investments were very sensitive to business cycles 
and current changes in returns show that the market is in recovery after the 
economic recession of 2008. 
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Figure 1. The 5-year rolling horizon IRRs of BO and VC funds in Europe and 
in the US from 1991 to 2013
Source: EVCA (2014)
Within the private equity industry, the focus has shift ed away from its 
traditi onal functi on of funding young and innovati ve companies that have 
smaller capital needs, towards the fi nancing of more matured companies with 
larger capital needs. One reason of this change is the high cost of screening 
and due diligence of the deals that are proporti onately more favorable in case 
of buyouts, but by analyzing the return characteristi cs of the investments it is 
also clear, that buyout funds outperform the venture capital funds based on 
the average risk-return trade-off  as well.
The yearly returns of the Hungarian market are infl uenced and biased 
by a few larger scale exit events as a result of the low sized market. In the 
coming years the investments of the government backed venture capital 
funds will approach exit ti me, so a record number of exits are expected by the 
closure of JEREMIE funds. On the other hand, while analyzing the exit acti vity 
of these funds, we have to be aware of the fact that, alongside the successful 
and highly profi table investments, there will be an increasing number of poor 
quality investments and low returns, as a result of the distorti ng eff ect of the 
temporary oversupply of capital induced by the government’s involvement. 
The role of the state in the venture capital market
In an insuffi  cient market the state can help in fi nding the new equilibrium 
point. Prior to the economic recession in 2008, the venture capital market 
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in the Central and Eastern European showed signs of prosperity but its 
development still lags behind the developed Anglo-Saxon countries’ markets. 
This realization led to a more intensive active and passive role of the state 
and, therefore, the traditional venture capital markets shifted towards the 
government backed investments (Karsai, 2014; Karsai, 2015).
In the venture capital market of the Central and Eastern European 
region around 50% of the accumulated capital was provided by government 
funds. In the background of this dominance is the JEREMIE Program where 
the capital for the funds is provided by the public and the private sector 
together and managed by market backed investors. Within the framework of 
this program investments have been made in Hungary since 2010. There are 
several incentives built into this program with the aim of attracting private 
investors. These include the partial taking over of losses and a profit ceiling 
on the public funds, which create favorable leverage and improve the risk-
return characteristics of the investments for private investors. But, on the 
other hand, these incentives may implicate a threat of excessive risk taking. 
The funds were committed to invest 80% of the capital and that may lead 
to adverse selection in terms of the invested companies. On the other 
hand the increased investment activity increases the available information 
concerning the potential investments and the mechanisms of venture capital 
funding and hence the JEREMIE funds play an important role in alleviating 
the information asymmetries between the actual and potential demand and 
supply of venture capital. In the framework of JEREMIE, 28 venture capital 
funds made around 310 investments, which prove that the great amount of 
available capital on the market helped those companies obtain capital that 
otherwise, in the absence of collateral, would not have been able to obtain 
outside funding. The invested companies were mainly technology and IT-
oriented, but companies in the field of life sciences and biotechnology were 
also able to obtain capital. The majority of the investments is currently active 
and awaits an exit, therefore the success of the investments, and with it the 
overall performance of the program itself, cannot be judged yet. However, 
the increased number of investments has already contributed to industry 
level knowledge and hence to the development of the venture capital market 
(Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 2015b). 
Figure 2 shows the actual capital disbursement of JEREMIE funds. 
JEREMIE funds were founded in four consecutive rounds but the progress of 
capital disbursement was low because of the complicated selection process. 
The slow progress of disbursement could be a sign of the low number of 
viable companies that are ready for investment as well. For the funds that 
were founded in the first round of the program, a wider range of investment 
opportunities had been available but because of the oversupply of capital and 
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the high number of deals, in the later periods of the program less and less 
companies could be found that had the potenti al to meet the selecti on criteria 
of the venture capitalists. Because the diff erent rounds of the program were 
implemented within a short ti me period with overlap, the demand side of the 
market could not regenerate the companies that are able to obtain venture 
capital. But on the other hand the funds had been committ ed to invest 80% 
of the managed capital that might lead to lower quality investments which 
decreases the chance of successful and profi table exits on average.
Figure 2. The number of deals and the amount* of capital disbursed 
by JEREMIE funds (in HUF billion) in 2010–2014
* The disbursed amounts contain the growth in the subscribed capital and capital reserve of the portf olio 
companies as in the balance sheet. Consequently, the data disclosed for the disbursed amount may 
exceed the actual amount of the disbursement.
Source: Author’s own editi ng based on the data of the fi nancial statements of the portf olio companies
The venture capital’s contributi on to the spin-off  companies, a special 
fi eld of venture capital value creati on
Based on 2012 research that was focusing on Hungarian university spin-off s, 
the most important barriers to insti tuti onal venture capital investments in 
Hungary are the following:
 • venture capitalists are not conversant with the technology of the fi rm 
(4.0)
 • venture capitalists are not willing to make smaller-scale investments 
(3.7)
 • high return expectati ons of venture capitalists (3.6)
 • the involvement of venture capitalists limits the authority of the chief 
executi ves in the operati on of the company (3.5)
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 • venture capital investors are averse to funding seed, early and early 
expansion stages (3.2)
 • low quality of the business plan (2.9)
 • lack of necessary business and managerial skills of the founders (2.8)
 • inadequate support of venture capital by the economic policy (2.7)
 • insufficient information about venture capitalists (2.6)
 • unfavorable exit prospects (2.6) (Becsky-Nagy, 2013)
JEREMIE, launched by the European Union in 2005, started its investment 
activity in 2010 and was implemented as part of the EU cohesion policy with 
the objective of alleviating the regional, social and economic differences by 
enhancing the financing prospects of innovative SMEs through structural 
funds that provide financial engineering instruments. The result of the 
program is that a great amount of capital has flown into the Central and Eastern 
European region’s venture capital market that has mainly been invested into 
technology-oriented SMEs and this has improved the competitiveness of the 
companies and the region as well. The program was implemented with very 
similar conditions in the different countries of the region but their success 
can only be evaluated after the closure of the funds (Farkas, Gyallai & Becsky-
Nagy, 2016).
The hybrid venture capital funds combine the methods of active and 
passive state involvement, as in this form, private investors with market 
experience manage mixed private and public capital, and the investment 
decisions are made by the private investors. The involvement of private 
investors strengthens the market perspective in the selection of possible 
investments, the “hands on” nature of the investments and the value added 
by the cooperation of investors and companies. The hybrid funds play a 
catalyst role in the development of the venture capital market. As a result 
of the increased investment activity, the private participants are able to gain 
experience and knowledge. At the same time, the venture capital awareness 
of the capital seeking firms’ increases as well, and this way hybrid funds 
enhance the actual development of the demand and supply of venture 
capital. On the other hand, the pressure of investing government funds 
raises the threat of adverse selection, as companies may receive funding that 
otherwise, under purely market conditions, they would not be able to meet 
the requirements of private investors. The soft requirements of hybrid funds 
distort the market and crowds out or bias the behavior of the few market 
participants that are willing to appear in the market. Such participants are 
mainly the angel investors.
In the long run, the withdrawal of the active role of the government’s 
funding and the increased role of passive participation in the market, 
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contributes the most to the efficiency of the venture capital market with the 
support of the start-up ecosystem. The passive role of the state is fundamental, 
not just temporarily as a catalyst in the venture capital market, but also in the 
long run in order to spur entrepreneurship via developing a stable economic, 
political, legal and capital market environment. The information asymmetries 
are prevailing especially in the case of rural regions and in order to support 
the innovative enterprises in these areas the mitigation of regional differences 
and the enhancement of regional environments is necessary.
DISCUSSION
The article described the special aspects of venture capital’s value creation 
methods in the face of the unique characteristics of the Hungarian venture 
capital market compared to the developed countries’ market. The first part 
of the article gives the general theoretical background of the venture capital 
funding with special regard to the specific risks of these investments and 
the various risk management methods used by the investors. The next part 
discusses the active and passive state role and its necessity in the venture 
capital market in the face of the partial results of the currently running 
JEREMIE program’s investments. 
The article also discusses how venture capital appears in the capital 
structure of the invested companies. 
The selection of suitable companies is fundamental to the success of the 
investments; therefore the selection process of the venture capitalist is the 
basic pillar of the value creation itself. Alongside the high return expectations 
a great proportion of the major selection criteria are connected to the 
management of the companies. 
The article describes how the value creation mechanisms appear in the 
return characteristics of venture capital investments in the US and Europe 
and attempts to evaluate the returns of the Hungarian market as well.
The section that discusses the financing background and prospects of 
university backed Hungarian spin-off companies reveals the problems and 
hindrances of venture capital financing in the case of these companies. In 
spite of the fact that spin-off companies cover just a segment of the potential 
targets of venture capitalists, based on their funding problems we can make 
some conclusions about the general problems of the industry.
CONCLUSION
My conclusion is that the government backed hybrid funds have a catalyst 
effect on the developing venture capital markets but in the long run the 
withdrawal of active involvement and an increasingly passive role can spur 
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the industry on in the most effective way. The venture capital industry is able 
to contribute to economic growth and employment (via its value creation 
mechanisms) the most, if the venture capitalists operate under market 
conditions. Based on the comparison of Central and Eastern European 
countries the JEREMIE Program had similar effects on the region’s markets.
There is not a prevailing and generally used financial instrument that 
supports value creation the most, instead the ideal form depends on the 
characteristics of the deals and the companies.
As was described in the discussion of the limited managerial decisions, 
the managerial assistance of the investors creates additional value only 
if the investors are capable of cooperating with the management of the 
company. Therefore, besides capital and competence, cooperation is also a 
determinant of venture capital’s value creation and that is the reason why 
the personnel traits of the companies’ management play a crucial role in the 
selection process.
The most important problems of the Hungarian venture capital market 
identified in the research based on the Hungarian spin-off companies, were 
targeted and tried to be solved through the JEREMIE Program. 
The examination of the demand side of the venture capital market can 
be a further research topic, in order to find the reasons of the insufficiency 
caused by the demand side. Another topic is to find a way in which the 
government could withdraw from the market in the long run to allow the 
market mechanisms to work independently.
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Abstract (in Polish)
Artykuł stanowi podsumowanie obszernych badań autorki i skupia się na metodach 
kreowania wartości przez fundusze venture capital. Rozpoczyna się przeglądem lite-
ratury, w którym opisano podstawy teoretyczne kreowania wartości. W drugiej czę-
ści artykułu przedstawiono badania empiryczne na rynku węgierskim, dla którego 
praktyki inwestorów w zakresie kreowania wartości nie zostały dostatecznie opisane 
w literaturze przedmiotu. W związku z tym, że w krajach europejskich państwo jest 
obecnie jednym z największych inwestorów w fundusze VC wspierającym projekty 
we wczesnej fazie rozwoju, w artykule zwrócono szczególną uwagę na rolę państwa 
na rynku VC. W tym kontekście wybór rynku węgierskiego jest uzasadniony, z tego 
względu, że rząd tego kraju dysponował największą pulą środków w Europie Środ-
kowo-Wschodniej pochodzącą z Inicjatywy JEREMIE, którą ulokował w funduszach 
hybrydowych podwyższonego ryzyka. Wnioski z zaprezentowanych badań są nastę-
pujące: podczas gdy wsparte przez rząd fundusze VC wywierają efekt stymulujący 
na rozwój rynku VC, to wycofanie się państwa w długim okresie z aktywnego zaan-
gażowania i przyjęcie pasywnej postawy może być bardziej skuteczne w pobudzaniu 
efektywności rynku VC.
Słowa kluczowe: venture capital, kreowanie wartości, rola rządu.
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